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WHO DECIDES THE SHAPE OF PRODUCT MARKETS?  
THE KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTIONS WHO NAME AND 
CATEGORIZE NEW TECHNOLOGIES  
Neil Pollock and Robin Williams  
University of Edinburgh 
 
We consider naming and categorization practices within the information technology (IT) arena. In 
particular, with how certain terminologies are able to colonise wide areas of activity and endure for 
relatively long periods of time, despite the diversity and incremental evolution of individual technical 
instances. This raises the question as to who decides whether or not a particular vendor technology is 
part of a product category. Who decides the boundaries around a technology nomenclature? Existing 
Information Systems scholarship has tended to present terminologies as shaped by wide communities 
of players but this does not capture how particular kinds of knowledge institutions have emerged in 
recent year to police the confines of technological fields. The paper follows the work of one such 
group of experts – the industry analyst firm Gartner Inc. – and discusses their current and past role in 
the evolution of Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software. We show how they make 
regular (but not always successful) ‘naming interventions’ within the IT domain and how they attempt 
to regulate the boundaries that they and others have created through episodes of ‘categorisation 
work’. These experts not only attempt to exercise control over a terminology but also the 
interpretation of that name. Our arguments are informed by ethnographic observations carried out on 
the eve of the contemporary CRM boom and interviews conducted more recently as part of an ongoing 
investigation into industry analysts. The paper bridges a number of disparate bodies of literature from 
Information Systems, Economic Sociology, the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, and Science and 
Technology Studies.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928866
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Names matter. The ways in which new technologies are named and categorized is a matter of basic 
importance to Information Systems (IS) research and other social scientific analyses. As those who 
have studied the information technology (IT) arena for any length of time will tell you, there appears a 
compulsion within this domain to rename technologies (Swanson and Ramiller 1997, Currie 2004). IT 
vendors periodically (and repeatedly) designate offerings differently from those of previous 
generations or from competitors. Between 1990 and 2002, for instance, industry application software 
vendors used nearly 400 different terminologies to describe products (Pontikes 2008). The 
conventional explanation for this is that competition pushes vendors to differentiate products from 
those of rivals. No one wants to be seen to be emulating a competitor and a new name would appear to 
constitute one important way to distinguish a difference.  
Yet, despite this compulsion, certain designations appear able to colonize wide areas of activity. Some 
technologies may be given a standard nomenclature that can then prevail for a significant period of 
time (as evidenced by the recent examples of MRP, MRPII, ERP, CRM etc.). These names refer not to 
a specific homogeneous product but to a more or less heterogeneous collection of artefacts (software, 
management techniques) which then went onto link a community (or, rather, several overlapping 
communities) of suppliers, intermediaries and adopters. Such terminologies proposed a boundary that 
linked a group of (often quite various) artefacts while differentiating them from others. This begs an 
important question that IS scholars have yet fully to answer.  
Who decides? Who determines the boundaries around a product terminology? By this we intend the 
question as to who judges whether or not an individual technology instance is included as part of a 
wider terminology. In other words, who, if anyone, is naming and categorizing technological fields?  
Current scholarship has tended towards a communitarian framing of this important issue. Who shapes 
a name? The community does. The overall conception of a product market is seen to be moulded not 
by any one specific individual or group but by vendors, adopters, journalists and consultants together, 
in what Wang and Ramiller (2009) have described broadly as the ‘innovation community’. 
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Terminologies gain traction precisely because no one group or actor has the final say on their shape 
and meaning. Passing through many hands a name becomes a hook that can facilitate a variety of 
understandings and interpretations leading all sorts of vendors to rebadge their systems according to 
the latest terminology. Indeed, such diversity and ambiguity in meaning is seen to lead to richness and 
robustness in the process of innovation around a terminology (Swanson and Ramiller 1997).  
This kind of formulation seems less adequate today. It represents a rather imprecise way to 
characterise what in fact has become a more organized process. One only has to look back at the 
recent history of information systems development, for instance, to see that, although the early stages 
of recent major innovations were characterised by initial ambiguity, later developments were pursued 
in a more structured manner. This was because at the outset of today’s modern corporate information 
system, the ‘institutions of information technology’ were often rudimentary and inchoate (and early 
accounts of these categories resembled the communitarian account above), but, over time, the 
institutional framework surrounding these technologies have become better established (Abrahamson 
and Fairchild 2001, Wang and Swanson 2007, 2008, Swanson 2010). Comparing the development of 
information systems today with the development of systems from just a couple of decades ago, we are 
struck by the number of specialised intermediaries that now surround workplace information 
technologies. 
We suggest that the communitarian view might be strengthened through foregrounding the emergence 
in recent years of the knowledge institutions of information technology that attempt to draw up and 
police the boundaries that surround new technological fields of activity (Swanson 2010). Clearly, 
vendors and other members of the wider community still feature centrally in the designation of a 
technology. However, the consensus surrounding an emerging field can often nowadays be steered 
inter alia by specialist forms of consultant known as ‘industry analysts’. We are not alone in noting 
this important development. Wang and Ramiller (2009: 20) have pointed to how it is industry analysts 
who are often the ‘originators’ of new terminologies or, if not the authors, the body at least which 
attempts to “provide the first public articulation of [an] innovation” (see also Swanson 2010). What we 
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want to do here is to develop this insight further through describing and conceptualizing in detail the 
work of one highly influential industry analyst firm.   
Our argument is that it is industry analysts who have established the cognitive authority to exercise 
control over the labelling of a technology and subsequent interpretation of that name. They do so 
through making continuous ‘naming interventions’ within the IT domain and then attempting to 
control how that name is carried forward through episodes of ‘categorisation work’. We focus 
specifically on one highly influential organization – perhaps the most prominent firm of analysts in 
relation to workplace information systems - Gartner Inc. (formerly the Gartner Group). We discuss its 
role in shaping the development and evolution of Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
technologies.  
The empirical part of the paper is presented in four ‘acts’. The first discusses how the analyst firm 
critically assessed a vendor seeking to enter a market for which it had no experience or reputation and 
where it was proposing to offer a novel CRM product. The second describes the various factors that 
shaped the analyst firm’s judgement – what we describe as its ‘knowledge frame’ (Beunza and Garud 
2007). As well as focusing on the capacity of industry analysts to shape technological fields, we also 
attend to the constraints on how they proceed. We find them to be operating in a highly complex 
environment where their interventions can be, and often are, contested. Thus, thirdly, we describe the 
opposition that can swell up around assessments, which can then force the analysts to have to defend 
their position. Contestation also reveals the internal disagreements that can emerge around these 
naming/categorization practices. We show how individual analysts within in the same firm were at 
odds with each other about whether or not the particular vendor was part of the CRM field (or indeed 
to which field it belonged). Fourthly, we conclude by discussing the ambiguity that has now grown up 
around CRM and what this means for the shape and direction of this particular technological field.  
Conceptualising the work of these market experts is not straightforward and requires the bridging of a 
number of disparate bodies of literature. This includes supplementing our conceptual toolkit with ideas 
from Economic Sociology on ‘critics’ (Zuckerman 1999, Rosa et al. 1999, 2003), the ‘finitist’ 
perspective from the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) (Barnes et al. 1996), and recent 
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Science and Technology Studies (STS) investigations into economic and financial markets (Beunza 
and Garud 2007). Our article is based on a longitudinal study that includes ethnographic research 
conducted on the eve of the birth of contemporary CRM and interviews carried out more recently as 
part of an ongoing study into industry analysts. 
2 COMMUNITY VERSUS COMMODITY 
A number of scholars have argued for the need to pay attention to the nomenclatures of technology 
supply and associated commentary as a site where technology futures are worked out and promises 
articulated and validated. In this respect, the new terminologies emerging within the IT sector have 
been conceptualised variously as ‘technological visions’ (Webster 1993), ‘organising visions’ 
(Swanson and Ramiller 1997), ‘practice-based imaginaries’ (Hyysalo 2006), ‘technological 
imaginaires’ (Flichy 2007), ‘fashions’ (Baskerville and Myers 2009), ‘IT innovation concepts’ (Wang 
2009), to name but a few. We focus here predominately on the notion of organising vision as it offers 
perhaps the most comprehensive account of this phenomenon in the IT application sector.  
Swanson and Ramiller (1997: 460) define an organizing vision as a “focal community idea for the 
application of information technology in organizations”. They developed the notion to show how the 
constant proliferation of ‘buzzwords’ in the information technology sector was not specious or hollow, 
as some had argued, but played an important role in mobilising the material and intellectual resources 
needed for innovation. One of the key aspects about organizing visions is that they are shaped not by 
specific individuals or groups but the wider IT innovation community. Terminologies are essentially 
seen as discourses that gain traction precisely because no one group or actor has the final say on their 
shape and meaning: 
The organizing vision is developed by many different storytellers, who modify and embellish it to suit 
their own and their audiences’ tastes and interests, and only more or less fully, never in complete and 
definitive detail. It necessarily changes and grows over time in the re-telling, as the community finds its 
way (ibid. 463). 
The analytical concept of an organising vision has given impetus to others to investigate the work 
names do in processes of innovation (Currie 2004, Wang and Swanson 2007, 2008, Swanson 2010). 
Relevant to our empirical focus, for instance, Wang (2009) has similarly theorised the rise of 
 6 
Customer Relationship Management as an ‘IT innovation concept’. He underlines how the term CRM 
was interpreted and understood differently across a diffuse and heterogeneous group of actors:  
…the customer relationship management (CRM) concept was created and developed by the CRM 
community. The once leading vendor, Siebel Systems, despite its dominance in that community, never 
owned the concept; anyone interested in CRM can read, hear, write, and talk about the concept. 
Members of the CRM community may agree or disagree on certain aspects of the concept and, thus, 
promote or discredit the concept accordingly (Wang 2009: 6). 
We find particularly useful the literature that draws attention to the wide range of constituencies now 
involved in the shaping of a new field and the resultant interpretive flexibility that can often surround 
an emerging technology. However, its focus on the ‘diverse interoganizational community’ (Swanson 
and Ramiller 1997: 458) may not sensitise fieldworkers to the presence and influence of the kinds of 
market actors described here. Moreover, whilst we acknowledge that the development of a 
technological field is not a space owned by any particular group of practitioners, vendors, users or 
analysts, it is also (increasingly) true that certain institutions now exert particular influence over it. 
The IT innovation community (Wang and Ramiller 2009), whilst it is a community, is not open and 
equal in the way in which we might conceive of ‘scientific communities’, say, operating under the 
Mertonian ideal (Mulkay 1976).  
In some of the first large-scale packaged workplace information technologies, the main institutional 
repositories were practitioners: user organisations, management professions and professional 
associations (Swan et al. 2003). However, we also note a pattern familiar from other innovations: the 
establishment of a division of expert labour. From the 1970s onwards, we have seen the increasing 
influence of management consultants, and by the 1990s, consultancy organisations were beginning to 
collate information about supplier offerings, while by the twenty-first century we find a much more 
elaborate system of consultancy and advice, and the emergence of specialist industry analysts, making 
available formalised and systematised assessments of particular vendors and their offerings (Swanson 
2010). Analysts are attempting to make comparative assessments of vendor technologies on a more 
commodified basis, a prerequisite for which is to define vendor systems and the application goals to 
which they are geared. What we witness is that a market is being built for new kinds of knowledge-
based products. We would point to how, today, the development and evolution of technological fields 
are increasingly shaped by processes of ‘commodification’. This imparts particular sets of dynamics to 
 7 
the community. As Adler and Heckscher (2006: 30) suggest, whilst commenting on the ineffectiveness 
of new kinds of markets for supplying knowledge, “individuals get the output of specific expertise but 
not the ability to interact with it and improve it”. We think there is an important point to be made in 
relation to how new kinds of actors and forms of knowledge constitute markets. Unpacking this further 
requires that we combine insights from IS research with relevant scholarship from Economic 
Sociology on ‘mediated markets’. 
2.1 Mediated Markets  
Economic Sociologists describe mediated markets as the places where ‘critics’ (as in ‘food critic’, 
‘theatre critic’, ‘wine critic’ etc.) play a pivotal role in shaping the nature of transactions between 
consumers and producers (Zuckerman 1999, Rosa et al. 1999, 2003). Critics are said to shape demand 
through endorsing products and this is said to nudge the choices of publics in certain directions. They 
also shape supply because whereas vendors are said to strive to differentiate themselves from 
competitors they are, through the presence of critics, seemingly forced to conform their goods in line 
with the main characteristics of other offerings in the product category targeted. Critics will seemingly 
only review those products that fit comfortably within the areas they cover (Zuckerman 1999). Those 
that do not fit within a particular category – because they are unclear, overly complex or ‘too novel’ - 
will be ‘screened out’ of consideration (ibid.). Products that fail to attract reviews and endorsements 
can be seen as ‘illegitimate’ (ibid.).  
From the point of view of Economic Sociology, the product category becomes the central aspect in a 
mediated market. It is described by Zuckerman (1999) as a ‘social screen’. This screen is “not 
designed by the actor but external to her, given in the categories that comprise market structure” (ibid.: 
1404). Actors, in other words, are forced to take this form of knowledge into account but are not 
necessarily able to shape it (cf. Adler and Heckscher 2006). 
The analysis of market critics provides useful insights into how product categories can shape product 
development through exerting (often isomorphic) pressures on vendors. However, we see two 
weaknesses with the approach as it is currently set out. First, whilst reading this literature, we learn 
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rather little about the complexities and possible disagreements that may exist around categorization 
work. Critics appear able to apportion vendors within the confines of stable classifications and 
according to fixed vendor product properties. This lends to the reading that the screening of vendors is 
a routine and unproblematic activity – a view with which sociologists interested in classification 
would almost certainly take issue.  
The ‘finitist’ perspective within the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), for instance, portrays 
the creation and maintenance of classifications altogether differently. For them, the categorization of 
an artefact cannot be fixed in advance (Barnes et al. 1996). Deciding whether something counts as a 
particular instance of a wider classification requires a decision to be taken and a process to be carried 
out. This is often a difficult and ambiguous process, which can be delegated to various forms of 
‘categorization work’. In this delegation, Barnes and colleagues (1996) note the central role of 
individual and collective ‘judgement’ in deciding. Moreover, even when a choice is made, there is 
every possibility of contestation, that a decision could be challenged: “No act of classification is ever 
indefeasibly correct” (ibid.: 56). 
Second, in weighing up the work on market critics, there are also obvious opportunities to bring in 
scholarship from Science and Technology Studies (STS), especially from those who have turned their 
attention to economic and financial markets (Callon 1998, 2007, MacKenzie 2006). These include 
scholars exploring the various material artefacts and intellectual equipment necessary for markets to 
operate (MacKenzie 2009). Researchers here have been seeking to recast and widen the debate on 
markets from one that focuses predominately on the ‘interpretative’ capacities of actors towards the 
tools and devices underlying and facilitating market-making processes (Callon et al. 2002). Extending 
this analysis to the work of critics, it might be suggested that conceptualising product categories as 
purely ‘social’ (or cognitive) would imply that they have a rather weak influence. An alternatively way 
to explain the constitutive effects of product categories might be to focus on the equipment involved in 
the screening processes. An exemplary instance of this latter ambition is a recent discussion of how 
securities analysts evaluate the issue of firm profitability (Beunza and Garud 2007).  
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2.1.1 Critics Construct Frames 
Beunza and Garud’s (2007) attempt to broaden the lens of Economic Sociology through suggesting 
that market categories are only one of the factors shaping the work of mediators. When securities 
analysts, for instance, attempt to value the potential profitability of a firm their view is shaped by what 
they call, drawing on Goffman, an ‘analytical frame’. An analytical frame is made up of a range of 
socio-material devices. Once constructed these frames are said to act to focus the security analyst’s 
attention on a specific set of circumstances, to the exclusion of other market information, directly 
suggesting how a new phenomena should be judged. Interestingly, they note how frames are 
susceptible to ‘controversy’. Indeed there can and often are ‘frame disputes’, which as Goffman (1974: 
323) notes are ‘endemic to framing’. These disputes arise because, once committed, securities analysts 
tend to persevere with a frame. To do otherwise, would seemingly diminish their ‘credibility’ (Beunza 
and Garud 2007). This commitment inevitably leads to disparities between different securities analysts 
- particularly between those reviewing the same phenomena whilst using a different frame. A 
controversy can lead an analyst eventually to abandon a frame in favour of another. 
In what follows, we employ several of the above ideas. We bring together the work on ‘organizing 
visions’ with that of ‘product categories’ (for new designations are surely also attempts to redraw the 
boundaries around classes of technology). We show how the industry analyst firm studied attempted to 
evaluate one particular vendor’s CRM offering and how this was complicated and fraught with 
disagreements; but also how analysts appeared to have established methods and tools for seemingly 
resolving such matters, which, influenced by Beunza and Garud (2007), we describe as their 
‘knowledge frame’. We find useful Beunza and Garud’s (ibid.) suggestion that frames can lead to 
disputes. However, our focus differs from theirs in one important respect in that we give greater 
attention to how industry analysts vigorously defend their frame. Before turning to the empirical 
material, we provide some detail on how we conducted our study. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Research Setting 
Our focus is specifically on the commercial research firm known as ‘Gartner Inc.’. With over 4,000 
employees and offices in 80 countries around the world, Gartner is widely recognised as the most 
influential of industry analysts (Burks 2006, Firth and Swanson 2002). It is reported to have over 
60,000 clients from 10,000 different organizations (Drobik 2010). Founded in 1979 by Gideon 
Gartner, the firm operates (almost exclusively) within the information technology sector, where it 
provides four kinds of services: it runs ‘executive programs’; it has an established consultancy wing; it 
organises regular themed conferences and symposiums on various emerging technological topics; and 
it produces research for the IT market. It is the latter activity that forms the bulk of its enterprise,  
where 80% of revenues are generated, and the majority of its 1,200 analysts are employed (Drobik 
2010).  
The influence of Gartner’s research has been noted within IS research (Ramiller and Swanson 2003, 
Firth and Swanson 2005, Burks 2006, Swanson 2010), with the episode attracting most comment 
being their authoring and subsequent shaping of the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) terminology. 
The successful designation of ERP by Gartner is widely acknowledged as a key development in the 
recent history of information systems. This was also a moment in which this group of experts appeared 
to gain a certain amount of cognitive authority.  
It was in their scenario document ERP: A Vision of the Next-Generation MRP II (Wylie 1990) that 
Gartner first coined the term ‘ERP’, proclaiming it the ‘new information system paradigm’. Mabert et 
al. (2001: 69-70), for instance, noted that Gartner not only created the term but set out what 
functionality it should contain: 
The Gartner Group coined the term ‘enterprise resource planning’ in the early 1990s to describe the 
business software systems that evolved as an extension of MRP II-type systems. They stipulated that 
such software should include integrated modules for accounting, finance, sales and distribution, HRM, 
material management, and other business functions based on a common architecture that linked the 
enterprise to both customers and suppliers. 
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Soon after, other players (most notably vendors and consultants) began to flesh out what ERP was and 
how it worked, followed by adopter accounts of the organizational benefits of its adoption (Wang and 
Ramiller 2009). Outwith this initial involvement, Gartner appeared to exercise a hold over the 
activities of ERP vendors, in particular through the production of various ‘research tools’. This 
included, for instance, their ‘vendor briefings’ that worked to consolidate the existence of this domain 
of technological activity. Vendor briefings constituted particular vendor offerings – a technology like 
SAP’s R/3 system, for example - as an instance of ERP (Author Study 2009).  
Gartner continued to chart ERP’s future development trajectory (Mabert et al. 2001, Judd 2006). In 
2000, for instance, they boldly declared ERP ‘dead’ and mapped out a transition to the next phase 
(described as ‘extended ERP’ or ‘ERP II’ [Bond et al. 2000]). However, on this occasion, Gartner’s 
death sentence turned out to be premature. This evidences how these organizations wield complicated 
and highly uneven kinds of influence. Not all interventions are able to sustain themselves. This throws 
up questions in relation to how we understand the prominence of these actors – an influence 
characterised by demonstrable moments of success but also equally failure – in subsequent 
technological fields.  
3.2 Research Approach 
We have been able to map out the changing dynamics of CRM and Gartner’s role in shaping CRM 
over the period of several years. The benefits of a longitudinal approach are that it will reveal how the 
capacities of the various knowledge institutions to control and police the boundaries surrounding CRM 
are not static but changing over time. This has been possible through conducting studies at different 
stages in the development and maturation of CRM. We carried out an initial study at the turn of the 
century where we were able to witness Gartner’s role in advising potential adopters of the benefits and 
disadvantages of particular CRM packages (Author Study 2007). We were able to return to this study 
through conducting further fieldwork almost a decade later on the more general influence of industry 
analysts. Here, as well as collecting new data, we were able to gain particular insights by re-examining 
with the benefit of hindsight our initial findings. 
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Fieldwork for our first study was completed on the eve of the emergence of contemporary CRM. Then 
there appeared to be little doubt that Gartner (just as it had done a few years previously with ERP) 
would have a strong hand in influencing the direction of this new field. All of its early writing pointed 
to how this would be the case. For instance in Top Ten Trends in CRM for 2001 Gartner fired a 
warning shot over the heads of any IT vendors who might have been thinking of simply rebranding 
their existing solutions as CRM systems: “About 500 enterprises claim to sell CRM software, but only 
200 actually do so” (Gartner 2001: 2). Our later fieldwork, however, reveals that in this context 
Gartner did not have anything like the same kind of influence. There now appears to be a number of 
industry analysts or equivalent organization speaking with authority about this field (Wang 2009). 
This observation highlights the importance of a longitudinal perspective in understanding the 
evolution of technological fields (see Author Study 2011). It also reminds us that whilst certain market 
actors can exert influence, the achievement of a new field takes place in an extremely heterogeneous 
landscape, involving a diverse and unevenly malleable array of social and material elements.  
3.2.1 The First Study (2000) 
Our interest in Gartner grew when one of us conducted a year long ethnographic study at a public 
organization (the bulk of which is reported in [Author Study 2007]). This large institution (hereafter 
‘UserOrg’) was attempting to complete the procurement of a new CRM system and had contacted 
Gartner to help in the evaluation of a number of prospective vendors. The procurement team were 
finding it difficult to assess critically the various options, thus an IT manager telephoned a Gartner 
analyst specialising in CRM. The advice received was then fed back to the wider procurement team 
(he would type up notes of his various discussions and circulate these at meetings of the wider 
procurement team). However, rather than clarify the situation, the analyst’s intervention created 
further confusion. It led to a hotly contested debate between Gartner and one particular vendor about 
the nature and novelty of their offering. This contestation is discussed below.  
One of the authors had good access to UserOrg for over a period of a year. He was able to attend and 
observe the various meetings concerning the procurement, to collect material such as email 
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communications and official correspondence, and interview the various players involved in the 
selection process. In total, the fieldworker attended more than a dozen such meetings and conducted 
over twenty interviews.  
3.2.2 The Second Study (2009-2011) 
Our second viewpoint on Gartner was when we returned to study their role in shaping CRM several 
years later as part of a further study into the nature and role of industry analysts. Here we conducted 
interviews with Gartner as well as with a range of other players in the industry analysis space. In terms 
of which Gartner analysts we choose to interview, these were not chosen randomly but we deliberately 
singled out those we had witnessed in our earlier research at UserOrg. The aim was to see whether 
(and how) Gartner’s view on CRM had developed in subsequent years. Two analysts in particular had 
been influential – one based in the UK and the other in North America. The American analyst has now 
left Gartner and is no longer an industry analyst – thus was not contacted. The UK analyst is still 
highly active in the field and we have interviewed him twice as part of our current study. We have also 
interviewed and had informal discussions with three other members of the CRM team. We also 
interviewed Gideon Gartner, the founder of Gartner, to help understand the history of Gartner’s 
naming practices. We interviewed several analysts from other competitor firms to ask them about 
Gartner influence in naming technological fields. In addition, finally, we have interviewed a number 
of analyst relations (AR) experts (actors who advise IT firms on how to interact with industry 
analysts).  
We have also been able to observe industry analysts going about their activities. For instance, we have 
attended on two occasions the annual two-day ‘Gartner CRM symposium’ in London. Here we have 
been able to observe and talk to with members of the wider Gartner CRM team as well as Gartner 
clients. We have participated in a number of Gartner web seminars on the topic of CRM. We have 
visited Gartner’s offices in London. Furthermore, we have been involved in a number of telephone 
conferences organised by analyst relations (AR) experts concerning the topic of CRM. Furthermore, a 
large part of the work of industry analysts comes in a published form. Some of these documents have 
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been downloaded from the internet and other pieces have been passed to us from the various industry 
analysts and Gartner clients interviewed. Data gathering has not ceased. We will continue to monitor 
the activities of industry analysts for at least another year. 
In terms of how we gathered data, our initial procurement study was exploratory (we were principally 
interested in the means and methods by which an organization compared several computer systems 
before selecting one). It was towards the end of this study that our attention was drawn (and this was 
something of a surprise) to the influence of industry analysts like Gartner. As we came to understand 
better Gartner’s research process, we became particularly aware of the importance of their ‘naming 
interventions’ and ‘categorization work’. Since much of the work of industry analysts appeared to be 
related to these two activities, this is where we focused our data collection. Thus, in the second stage 
of the research we purposefully directed interviews and discussions towards understanding how (and 
why) analysts named new technological trends, how they were able to categorise vendors as belonging 
to a particular classification, and so on.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
These two episodes of fieldwork have led to the collection of a large body of data. We initially 
identified those aspects of this data set that were related to naming and categorization and then set 
about sorting these into primary themes. For instance, this included the process of “how industry 
analysts actually categorized vendors”, “what knowledge, practices and tools they had for doing this”, 
“what tensions/difficulties surround such the process”, and so on. This roughly followed the open 
coding process found within Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Later we continued to 
develop our analysis through constructing a narrative to gain further insight into how these themes 
related to the chronology of events in the procurement study we had previously observed. We 
eventually settled for a dramaturgical structure because of the resources it offered for organizing this 
data. This was in particular the notion of ‘the act’, the idea that a ‘drama’ was unfolding and the focus 
on ‘actors’ and the various ‘roles’ they play (Feldman 1995). We felt that presenting our study in ‘four 
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acts’ usefully conveyed the sense that there was some kind of performance going on and that there 
were a number of elements that went into the making of that performance.    
4 ACT ONE: YOU’RE NOT ON OUR LIST 
We begin by discussing Gartner’s intervention during the UserOrg procurement. Gartner had been 
asked to provide the organization with information on the various CRM systems being considered. 
The ‘vendor briefing’ is one of the most common research tools used by Gartner and other industry 
analyst firms to scope out the market. It is the principle vehicle whereby IT vendors present offerings 
and business strategies to analysts covering their particular product market (Gartner, no date). The idea 
is for analysts to collect information about vendors, which then form the basis of later assessments or 
recommendations. Gartner purportedly conduct more than 12,000 briefings with vendors every year 
(Drobik 2010). Vendors are ‘selected’ for briefings based on the research interests of the particular 
analyst firm but, also, in the case of Gartner, because this firm is attempting to “cover the breadth of 
IT subject matter” (Gartner, no date). It is also common for Gartner’s clients to ask for briefings to be 
undertaken on their behalf. Alternatively, vendors (especially newcomers) may contact Gartner in 
order to brief them. Whilst Gartner advertise their coverage to be extensive, it also acknowledges that 
no analyst firm can cover all vendors in a market (ibid.). 
4.1 Providing an Assessment of Vendors 
Gartner was sent the names of the vendors as well as the basic description of the kinds of solutions 
offered. A Gartner analyst based in the UK (hereafter ‘Tom’), responsible for providing research 
specifically on the CRM market, responded with his view on each of the possibilities. These were then 
summarised in a document by a UserOrg IT manager before being circulated within the wider 
UserOrg procurement team. The analyst’s comments were described as follows:  
LAGAN has done a good job in Birmingham and Belfast. They are very specifically working in the 
Local Government marketplace, they know the business well and [Tom’s] view is that they should be 
on the list of products to be considered. ONYX is a US company and...work mainly in the private 
sector. Their products are good, but there would be some concern over scalability if we expected the 
operation to extend to hundreds of users in the front-office.…[Tom] has a list of some 500 vendors of 
CRM, many of which he meets on a regular basis to track the development of their products. 
[PICOLO] is not on the list, he had not heard of them. He took an action to speak to a colleague based 
in America and come back to [UserOrg] on what the US Analyst knew of them. SIEBEL has the largest 
share of the commercial marketplace, but he [Tom] felt that in a few years, ORACLE will have 
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emerged as the leading supplier to the Local Government market. This is not because it has the best 
products, but because it is better at selling to Local Government (note circulated within UserOrg). 
Prima facie, there was nothing particularly surprising about these reviews. Only one vendor (Lagan) 
appeared to receive an unqualified endorsement. The remainder were seen to have both a number of 
strengths and weaknesses. It was only through paying close attention to the detail of the document that 
one finds the bombshell. The vendor we are calling ‘Picolo’ appeared to be something of an anomaly 
in Gartner’s eyes. It did not appear on any of its ‘lists’, meaning the analyst firm could not provide 
specific commentary on this vendor. The analyst stated how he would check with Gartner colleagues 
based in the US as to whether they could provide more detail. In the meantime, he provided some 
preliminary comments based on his analysis of the documentation sent: 
They speculated that the [Picolo] product was a toolkit rather than a full solution. In this case their 
concern would be how much expertise [the ‘joint venture partner’ working with UserOrg] had with the 
product. It was explained that [Picolo] staff would be likely to be involved in the installation as well. 
[Tom] would then be concerned about the ongoing support once the [Picolo] specialists leave the site. 
He felt that [UserOrg] would be the Guinea Pigs for this solution and in our position he would not be 
prepared to take the risk (note circulated within UserOrg). 
Based on limited information, the analyst was able to raise a number of concerns about Picolo, 
consisting mainly of the fact that Picolo appeared not to have a ‘complete’ local government CRM 
solution available. Since previous customers were all from different sectors (telecommunications and 
banking), this meant it would have to carry out extensive redevelopment of its existing system. 
UserOrg would potentially therefore be ‘guinea pigs’ for this work. In the analyst’s view, it was not 
worth taking the ‘risk’. Later the same week the Gartner analyst gets back in touch to say that he had 
spoken to his US colleagues and they too were unaware of Picolo. No vendor briefings had been 
carried out on this vendor. Gartner therefore could not provide further information. This latest news 
caused some disconcertion amongst UserOrg employees: Picolo had attracted many complimentary 
comments about both its technical ability and the willingness of its technical staff to address the needs 
of UserOrg. For many people it was their ‘preferred option’. This was now seemingly being 
challenged.  
UserOrg thought it necessary to give Picolo the opportunity to respond to the (potentially damaging) 
review, which it choose to do and in a robust manner. Picolo pointed to a number of issues related to 
the status of its software (this included the fact that whilst its solution was ‘new’, the various 
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components going into it were “tried and tested products” already running in various other sites 
around the world). It also raised some objections to the kinds of research produced by industry analyst 
firms. In particular, it pointed out how “…at present these companies do not have a category for what 
[Picolo] are offering…”. As a result, because of the narrow way these experts currently conceived of 
Customer Relationship Management, Picolo had therefore “…not spent any time making itself known 
to industry analysts”.  
When informed about Picolo’s comments, Gartner, in turn, sought to defend its own position. The 
analyst pointed out how it was not him problematising Picolo but the Gartner client base. He describes 
how one important way Gartner gets information was not simply through “being briefed” by 
technology vendors but through contact with their own clients. He goes onto add how the CRM team 
had conducted over 150 CRM vendor briefings in the last year alone and only a small number of these 
had been initiated at the request of vendors. The bulk came through requests from their clients. The 
important point, he notes, was that in all these requests “[n]o client has asked us to ask for a briefing 
from [Picolo]”, which he thought was something of a ‘surprise’. 
To summarise, the industry analyst firm Gartner has thrown into question a procurement choice 
through casting doubt over one particular vendor – the newcomer that had emerged as the favourite. In 
the eyes of Gartner, Picolo was an unknown quantity. As they saw it, they were not part of the CRM 
field. They thus provided a potentially critical review of this particular offering – one that later leads to 
Picolo being removed from the user organization’s list of possible options (for more detail on this see 
Author Study 2007). This begs the question: Why was this vendor problematised in this way? 
Answering this requires investigating Gartner’s research process. 
5 ACT TWO: GARTNER’S KNOWLEDGE FRAME 
5.1 Making Sense of a Bit of Chaos 
The information technology market is extremely complex. It is fast changing with the constant arrival 
of innovations, concepts and terminologies (Swanson and Ramiller 1997). Through conducting their 
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research industry analysts see their job as ‘trying to make sense of a bit of chaos’ (interview, Gartner 
analyst). They are attempting to provide some ‘clarity’ to those paying for their services. Here we 
want to show that they have established means for doing this. This includes the methods to scrutinise 
the claims vendors make about technologies. This task is facilitated by a wide range of social and 
technical components. Perhaps another way to say this is that these analysts have established ‘frames’ 
(Beunza and Garud 2007) through which they view developments in the market. Let us look in more 
detail at the nature and form of these frames. 
5.1.1 Naming Interventions 
An essential part of Gartner’s framing of an emerging technological field is the various ‘naming 
interventions’ it makes. Gartner are prolific in designating technologies - the successful naming of 
ERP being only the tip of the iceberg (Mabert et al. 2001). Here an industry analyst reflects on why 
firms like his have emerged to perform this role: 
…often they [IT vendors] don’t have the clout in their own right to name… They haven’t got the 
independence to be able to; unless they are so huge that they dictate, determine what the market is 
called. But that is rare. Normally somebody wants a third party to make that ‘naming intervention’. It 
could be academia that does it; sometimes it is. It could be a group of vendors who get together and 
start using common terms. But normally the vendors are desperately trying to use different terms 
because they don’t want to be seen to be copying or following a competitor. So what happens with us is 
we [Gartner] are in effect drawing a starting line saying: ‘there is the line’. And everybody lines up 
behind it... (interview, Gartner analyst). 
Naming interventions are the analysts’ means of sorting the world for its clients. It is not just their 
expertise and knowledge that makes them well placed to do this but also because - and apparently 
unlike other commercial actors – as the analyst goes onto describe, they have no ‘axe to grind’. They 
seemingly have the ‘independence’ and ‘credibility’ to name a technology. They are the only ones able 
to draw a ‘sensible box’ or ‘starting line’ from which others can build. A Gartner analyst talked us 
through what he thought his firm was doing in coining new terms: 
When something like CRM comes up or ERP or whatever, you’ll find that what was going on there was 
that analysts were going: ‘Look there’s a pattern. There’s a trend. It’s consolidating. This is coalescing 
or whatever. This vendor has bought that one. This is going to go in that direction. It’s all going to end 
up like that. And that’s going to be called [pauses for effect] ‘ERP’’. We are doing that for the users. 
The vendors then go: ‘Great. That is where we are going. Boom! We’re an ERP vendor’. They do it 
because they can see that we have drawn a box around a market that they are slap right bang in the 
middle of and they feel that they can dominate it or have a serious part to play (interview, Gartner 
analyst). 
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Gartner is attempting to make sense of developments for users. The particular analyst is clear about 
this. He repeated it several times during interviews and discussions. However, he also notes how these 
interventions affect the activities of vendors – who will often align themselves around a new 
terminology. He explained this (constitutive) effect through describing how Gartner had been 
influential in classifying some of the technologies related to CRM: 
…we coin[ed]…acronyms like ‘MRM’, which is Marketing Resource Management in about 2001. 
EFM - I think we came up with in about 2005.…. So, for example, in marketing, we used to talk about 
MOM…which is like Marketing Operations Management. We decided we would prefer the term 
Marketing Resource Management. I can’t remember exactly why, but it was about the resourcing, 
staffing and operational issues, and it is interesting now you will hardly ever see the term MOM. It just 
got slaughtered by MRM. And every vendor says ‘We are an MRM vendor’. And it got its own 
momentum and off it went. That is kind of how it works (interview, Gartner analyst).  
According to the analyst, their terms acquire their ‘own momentum’ and that seemingly ‘is kind of 
how it works’. Of course, just how it works is the issue that needs to be explained. When pressed for 
further detail on what Gartner did when coining terms, the analyst talked us through an example that 
he and a colleague had recently been involved in: 
I can tell you the story of EFM very clearly, because I have been involved in that with one with my 
colleagues…. [He] and I were looking at it and saying…‘well wait a minute. There is an elite group of 
Feedback Management vendors here who are giving multi-channel, real time, and they are doing 
analytics, and they are handling multiple different processes with one tool, and they are pitching 
themselves as a means to consolidate, a bit like ERP, down to one tool for handling all inbound and 
outbound feedback between themselves and the customer’. So we said it is: ‘something Feedback 
Management’. And we noticed that there is a company up in Boston [who] started to use the term 
‘EFM’ – Enterprise Feedback Management – and we went ‘that’s the term we like’. So we basically 
stole it and started using it. We said…‘this is EFM and this is FM. This is Feedback Management and 
this is Enterprise Feedback Management and these are the players in the market and this is what is 
going on’. We started that about…2005. And if you look around now, any Feedback Management 
vendor who is of any decent type will have EFM slapped all over their website because that is the term 
(interview, Gartner analyst). 
Interestingly, as the analyst (perhaps unintentionally) lets slip, Gartner are not always strictly the 
authors of terms. However, it is the organization that further develops and gives increased impetus to 
them; they help shepherd terms. And the analyst thought that Gartner’s seeming ability to successfully 
promote terms as related to ‘timing’ and its extensive connections to the wider community: 
If Gartner steps in at the right moment - and it is coalescing; and no term has got dominant position - 
with Gartner getting in and stamping it, with the right timing, then that is what the term becomes. 
Because Gartner has got a rough contact with so many customers; because that is where we get our 
information. Yet we know most of the vendors. We are a big organization. We can get organizations to 
agree that is the term. Because we in effect draw a box around something and say: ‘That is the market. 
There’s the definition of it. These are the elements. These are the players. This is how you evaluate it. 
This is how you compare’ (interview, Gartner analyst). 
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Gartner (more than any other industry analyst firm) has been successful in naming technologies. 
However, whilst it appears to have had continued success, there has also been a number of ‘failures’. 
What is interesting to note is that the majority of these are not public failures because most naming 
interventions tend to ‘die internally’: 
More difficult is where you try something out and it doesn’t fly. What tends to happen there is that it 
tends to die internally more often than not. In other words, an analyst becomes an advocate of 
something…there’s a team of people who created it, but the key issue is that there is a team of people 
involved but there is one leader who is passionate about it and relentless. That is the key thing. It is 
partly the intellectual curiosity and the intellectual exercise of ‘that’s the way things are going’, ‘that’s 
the trend’, and being right! It is a combination of that but also being an absolute heavy, marketing it to 
death - internally first, because unless it flies internally it will never get outside. So normally by the 
time it has got outside it has got 20 or 30 analysts behind it, going ‘yeah. That’s the term we are going 
to use. That’s the term. That makes sense. That’s the term I’m going to use. I’ll make sure that I’ll 
reference that in my work’. And so it has got momentum in it. And Gartner will hammer away at it for 
several years often, till it gets enough momentum to get it going (interview, Gartner analyst). 
Conceiving of and shepherding a name is not simply an ‘intellectual exercise’ but equally involves 
enrolling and convincing others. If a terminology is to get outside Gartner, then, it must already have 
mobilised an internal community of support. This means that individual analysts must become 
‘passionate’ about a concept such that they can persuade others of its benefits (‘marketing it to death – 
internally first’). Thus by the time it gets ‘outside’, if it is indeed to get outside, then there must 
already a significant group committed to its success. Here we get a glimpse of both the internal 
community that must be mobilised within Gartner but also of the organizational machinery that needs 
to be set in train to help shepherd a term. 
5.1.2 Intellectual and Material Equipment 
Thus far, in common with the notion of organizing vision (Swanson and Ramiller 1997), we have 
talked primarily about new terminologies as ‘discourses’. However, in the last section, we also 
introduced the notion of ‘organizational machinery’. By this, we intend that the frames of industry 
analysts are both symbolic and material. Names are aided in their operation with various kind of 
‘equipment’. We saw this quite vividly in the case of Picolo where a classification worked to 
problematise this particular actor (a classification is what MacKenzie [2009] might term ‘intellectual 
equipment’). Gartner’s definition of CRM was not simply a theoretical construct but one supported by 
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various kind of listings, as we see below, including lists of players and their products’ core 
characteristics.  
This said, it should be noted however that many of these lists appeared to have a particularly ‘local 
flavour’. We describe what we mean by this through discussing Gartner’s attempts to computerise 
their lists (see Leyshon and Thrift [1999] for a discussion of the automation of lists). In principle, lists 
could be held on enterprise-wide electronic databases within Gartner, such that information belonging 
to one analyst could be made available to colleagues elsewhere, especially those located in different 
geographical locations. However, as we saw in the discussion of Picolo, even those analysts 
specialising in the same area did not appear routinely to share information with each other. The UK 
analyst, for instance, had to check via the telephone with US colleagues as to whether anyone in the 
US offices had information on Picolo. It seems the computerisation of lists occurs but only in a rather 
limited way. An analyst explains why this is so: 
We’ve got skills databases: ‘who knows what’. Client services team uses that, so it is to route the call to 
the right analyst. Each team has knowledge bases. They tried these glorified schemes of having a 
centralised knowledge base. There are some company wide ones...But we are not keeping volumes of 
information on each vendor because it changes so fast, to maintain it. It is usually just garbage most of 
what is in there. You look at it, and you go: ‘Where the hell did this come from? It is about 3 years old’. 
Hopeless! So it’s got to be maintained frequently. So what you are really seeing is that each analyst has 
to maintain their own ‘pod of knowledge’ and the job will be to find the analyst with the knowledge 
(interview, Gartner analyst).  
The analyst notes the problem of how information stored within centralised information sources 
quickly becomes ‘garbage’. Obviously, as noted at the outset of the paper, this is a world that is 
changing quickly, where knowledge is contextual and contingent. It thus appears that analysts do not 
work with formalised (centralised) kinds of information but keep control of their own individual ‘pods 
of knowledge’. Lists and knowledge are attached to particular (groups of) analysts. We return to this 
point in Act Three, where we argue that a corollary of this is that analysts can often end up employing 
different frames when analysing the same vendor.  
5.1.3 Frames are Entangled within the Wider User Community 
Discussing these local forms of knowledge begs the question as to how analysts form their views (or 
compile their lists). Where does their knowledge come from? There appears to be three main sources: 
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talking amongst themselves (for instance, where they ‘peer review’ each others reports); meeting with 
(and quizzing) the actual vendors that are being assessed (the ‘vendor briefings’ discussed above); and 
through interacting with their clients (who are often the actual users of these technologies). In all our 
dealings with Gartner, these latter interactions were said to be the primary opinion-forming source for 
analysts (and this was evidenced by the discussion of Picolo above). A Gartner analyst expresses the 
scale of the interactions analysts might have over a ‘normal’ year: 
…some of the analysts last year were doing a thousand enquires, that’s a thousand calls a year, 200 
working days doing five calls a day, that’s five hours on the phone a day just talking to 
customers…Then face to face like I am doing here, there might be another 150, 200 conversations like 
that in a year so, [then] 700 face to face conversations of 20 minutes up to an hour. That’s a lot of data 
in just one area. So as long as you are narrow enough in your focus, you would have to be an idiot, I 
personally believe you would have to be an idiot not to work out what is going on in that area 
(interview, Gartner analyst). 
Thus built into a frame is this process of interaction with clients. This can involve relatively simple 
interchanges: for instance, the number of times an analyst is asked about a particular vendor. It can 
also – and perhaps especially – come from more qualitative forms of dialogue: such as continually 
hearing comments of a certain type about a vendor. An analyst describes how most of these comments 
came when they were explicitly searching for feedback on particular vendors (as when they called up 
the ‘references’ supplied by vendors) but also in other interactions where it was common for their 
clients to be candid about their experiences with vendors. An analyst gives an example of typical kinds 
of feedback: 
‘Oh yeah, I forgot to tell you that they were complete idiots. They did x,y,z’. And you go ‘Right. Why’s 
that?’ ‘Oh, they did this. They sent this guy along and his name is’, that sort of thing. Sometimes you 
can even get down to which individuals in which companies are screwing up (interview, Gartner 
analyst). 
To summarise, what we are arguing is that, in order to make sense of the IT domain, Gartner builds 
knowledge frames. These frames then go onto create boundaries within the marketplace (primarily but 
not exclusively through ‘naming interventions’); they generate certain kinds of problematics amongst 
technology vendors (through episodes of ‘categorization work’). The frames of industry analysts are 
supported by intellectual and material equipment (lists and databases); and are shaped by the 
interactions analysts have with wider communities of users. The next section shows a further aspect of 
frame making which concerns the ability of industry analysts to ‘defend’ their frames. We examine 
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this by returning to Gartner’s encounter with Picolo and showing the further forms of contestation that 
emerged between these actors.  
5.2 Gartner Defend their Frame 
The discussion around Picolo’s system was characterised by two starkly contrasting positions. On the 
one hand, Picolo saw itself as an innovative player, offering more than a simple CRM solution. The 
problem, in their view, lay with Gartner’s rather narrow classification of CRM. On the other hand, 
Gartner strongly disagreed. Everything in their frame pointed to the fact that Picolo would be ‘a risk’. 
They were not, in their view, part of the CRM field. The issue came to a head when Picolo were asked 
to say what exactly was unique about their proposal. Gartner, in turn, was invited to comment on these 
claims. The episode was played out when Picolo produced a document describing how their solution 
differed from those offered by competitors. We reproduce the main parts of the exchange here. Picolo 
begins by outlining the novel features of their system: 
[Picolo] is the first vendor to provide an integrated framework approach (Picolo document, our 
emphasis). 
The ‘integrated framework approach’ is Picolo’s own terminology. This seemingly provides a more 
connected type of CRM solution. Gartner’s repost however is that Picolo’s claims are exaggerated and 
that their approach is similar to what other vendors are already offering:  
Loud Cloud. Graham Technologies and several others have said the same in the past (Gartner 
Comments appended to Picolo document). 
Picolo sets out the details of how its offering differs from others – emphasising particularly the 
disconnected and ‘patchwork’ nature of competitor technologies:  
With other vendors, [UserOrg] would be buying separate products for CRM, Portal front-end, CTI, 
workflow and document management, email automation and rules engines. While individually these 
might compare favourably with the [Picolo] components, this would be a patchwork solution and it 
would be very difficult getting these components successfully integrated (Picolo document). 
Picolo state that competitor systems are made up of distinct components that have to be brought 
together through laborious (and potentially risky) forms of programming work. They point to how 
their solution already contains important integration functionality that other vendors would be required 
to bring in from elsewhere. Gartner refute this, noting how there are already systems on the market 
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with most if not all of these capabilities. As Gartner see it, other vendors could market their systems in 
the exact same way: 
The majority of vendors in this space will provide some form of portal front-end, call management, 
eService, workflow, email automation and rules engines plus CTI integration (but not CTI). Usually this 
is achieved through partnerships with a small number of partners (e.g. Interactive Intelligence with 
Onyx and Siebel with Avaya) (Gartner comments appended to Picolo document). 
Gartner then focus on the similarity between Picolo’s and one other vendor system: 
It is interesting the degree of overlap with eGain. We would see eGain as a vendor that already 
competes in the eService, email, workflow and a portal front-end but not in the area of CTI or call 
management. Software vendors have not traditionally crossed the boundary between application and 
infrastructure but Avaya with Quintus and Altitude would make the same arguments as those made here 
(Gartner comments appended to Picolo document). 
Here they concede a novel feature of the Picolo system - that it is has ‘crossed the boundary between 
application and infrastructure’ - but also point out how other vendors might make the same claim (see 
Rao et al. [2005] for a discussion of the difficulties this kind of ‘boundary crossing’ within product 
categories brings). Gartner also refutes the suggestion that integrating the various components in one 
system would be problematic – highlighting how Picolo itself might suffer the same kind of 
integration difficulties:  
We disagree that all combinations are very difficult to get them to work together – it depends on the 
combination of products selected and whether that combination has been achieved before. [Picolo] is 
not exempt from integration with the ACD system and the existing eGain applications (Gartner 
comments appended to Picolo document). 
This exchange highlights further aspects of Gartner’s frame – in particular the issue of 
commensuration. Espeland and Stevens (1998) suggest that powerful actors attempt to maintain 
existing classifications (and resist enlargement to account for more variability) to preserve their ability 
to commensurate. That is, to maintain comparability amongst vendors (Lounsbury and Rao 2004). In 
other words, their methods are fundamentally relative: they assess vendors not as stand-alone 
organizations but always in relation to others. The result is that Gartner is able to point out that the 
apparently novel features of Picolo’s Integrated Framework Solution are already contained within 
existing offerings.  
To summarise, what we have shown is that when contested Gartner will robustly defend its frame. It 
does this mostly through processes of commensuration, which, as argued by Espeland and Stevens 
(1998), can appear a highly robust mechanism to defend seemingly controversial decisions. It is one 
 25 
that seemingly puts decision making on a ‘neutral’ plane (everyone can see the characteristics of 
competing systems, such that individual bias is apparently pushed out of the frame). Act three 
continues this focus on contestation but this time through discussing a face-to-face meeting between 
Gartner analysts and Picolo employees. Here we ask: If a frame shapes the way industry analysts 
assess a vendor then what happens if a vendor is viewed through different frames? 
6 ACT THREE: INTERNAL DISSENT: NOT ALL IN GARTNER 
VIEW THINGS IN THE SAME WAY 
6.1 Different Reactions to the Same Data 
Since the confusion surrounding Picolo was growing rather than declining, and because there were no 
available research papers on the vendor, UserOrg decided to ask Gartner to conduct a vendor briefing 
on their behalf. (As a Gartner client, they had the possibility of commissioning a number of briefings 
each year). Thus, several weeks later, a number of US based analysts finally sat down with Picolo 
employees to quiz them about their technologies. The meeting appeared productive for both parties. 
One Gartner analyst (identified throughout as ‘Dr S’) feeds back her thoughts and assessment to 
UserOrg:  
[Dr S] covered [Picolo’s] reasons for not making themselves known to Gartner before, i.e. an emerging 
company whose product doesn’t fit neatly into existing categories. They see themselves as providers of 
business process utility solutions/service providers rather than simply software suppliers. They 
customise their products for a particular industry sector and aim to share the cost across the customer 
base to reduce costs. [Dr S] felt they had a very theoretical way of presenting themselves and had found 
it difficult to find the appropriate analyst (note circulated within UserOrg). 
This comment appears double-edged. On the one hand, Dr S points to the problem new IT vendors  
experience when starting out (they are an ‘emerging company’ and their products do not nearly fit into 
existing industry analyst categories). She identifies how Picolo thought itself ‘residual’ (Star and 
Bowker 2007) in relation to the way Gartner categorise and define CRM. On the other, she also 
indirectly criticises them for failing to understand the role and influence of industry analysts (how to 
relate to them, how much effort to invest in interacting with them, how to present its strategies and 
 26 
products, and so on). However, Dr S then goes as far as to suggest that UserOrg should not give too 
much weight to the initial assessment of her UK colleagues: 
She advised not to read too much into the fact that they were not known to Gartner. It was in [Picolo’s] 
interest not to be classified with other CRM vendors as they offer broader services. They did not want 
to be seen as simply a software vendor. They had perhaps failed to take a more pragmatic approach to 
this (note circulated within UserOrg). 
Indeed the analyst explicitly points out how it was advantageous for Picolo not to be compared with 
other CRM vendors since they were offering something different/more. She then lists further (mostly 
positive) aspects about Picolo that were not surfaced in the initial assessment: 
Analysts attending the briefing had been impressed with [Picolo’s] knowledge of their marketplace and 
their understanding of software evolution…[Picolo] have a legacy of customers in the Insurance, 
Banking and Telco sectors both as [Picolo] and former companies. Less so in the Government sector. 
The client list is impressive (note circulated within UserOrg). 
The analyst commented positively on their ‘knowledge of the marketplace’ and their ‘understanding of 
software evolution’, two of the important criteria by which Gartner rates and evaluates vendors (see 
Author Study 2009). She also passes comment on their impressive ‘client list’, which, as already 
mentioned, was another of the criteria by which vendors are judged. When the conversation turns to 
some of the more thorny issues, the analyst gives her view of the ‘risk’ of going with an unknown 
quantity: 
Asked for comments about it being risky going with a company we had not previously heard of, she 
said that it is not necessary always to go with a big name, but the risk has to be managed. A key 
question is who is responsible for delivery. It was explained that [a joint venture partner] is the prime 
contractor and [Dr S] said we then have to ask how we will be protected by [the joint venture partner] 
against non-delivery (note circulated within UserOrg). 
What this analyst does is bring into the frame other factors. In particular, this is the fact that Picolo is 
not acting alone in supplying its systems but supported by a joint venture partner organization - a large 
telecommunications company with a recently established software and systems integration division. It 
is made clear that it is the joint venture partner that is ultimately responsible for delivering a successful 
project. The analyst also points out that it is also in Picolo’s direct interest to ensure the project is a 
success: 
[Picolo] is still an emerging company and has to build a list of satisfied clients. [Dr S] would therefore 
expect them to ensure that projects were a success (note circulated within UserOrg). 
Comparing this assessment with the previous one, we find that the analysts are focusing on the same 
vendor but coming to different conclusions. In concluding the US analyst makes a point that goes 
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some way to explaining these contrasting assessments. Her area of expertise is not strictly speaking 
CRM solutions; she specialises in ‘Business Process Outsourcing’ (BPO):  
[Dr S] said that she was not a CRM specialist; Business Process Outsourcing was her speciality. It had 
been [Picolo’s] choice not to go into the CRM category. She emphasised, however, that [Picolo] is not a 
Business Process Outsourcer. They work with partners, perhaps the most significant being a recent 
project in Australia with EDS as the partner (note circulated within User Org). 
A way to conceptualise this, perhaps, is to suggest that the analyst is not committed to the same frame 
as her UK colleagues. She is investigating UserOrg from a different modality. It could be argued that 
vendor qualities are being constituted through two different frames, and because these organise 
responses, they each create different kinds of problematic. Viewed through the initial ‘CRM frame’ 
Picolo is compared to other CRM vendors (and is seen to be replicating only what is already in the 
marketplace). There is the use of particular kinds of equipment and interactions (‘lists’ constituted 
from community engagement). The problems raised include Picolo’s absence from ‘lists’, that they are 
‘not known’ to the community, there is not a complete system available, which means there is a high 
level of ‘risk’ involved, and so on. Alternatively, the ‘BPO frame’ appears more diffuse. It is one that 
includes but is not limited to CRM (there are multiple overlapping technology suppliers who have a 
potential claim to be involved in this area). When constituted through this frame it is recognised how 
Picolo is offering ‘broader services’. Here the equipment includes ‘lists’, but this time of ‘impressive 
clients’. The issue on which the vendor is assessed is the fact that it is backed by a significant ‘joint 
venture partner’. Further, the US analyst reinterprets the problems raised by the earlier analyst 
(unknown, risk, etc.) and concludes that these may not necessarily be reasons for concern. They could 
equally be understood as reasons why to choose Picolo.  
6.2 Competing Frames 
What does this example of competing frames tell us? It suggests that this large industry analyst 
organization is not a ‘unity’; there is no single Gartner-wide community. Frame building appears to be 
an idiosyncratic ‘craft’ (as opposed to a standardised scientific) model of knowledge making. Analysts 
are highly reputed individuals trading in the Gartner realm – attempting to further their own 
reputations (authority). Indeed, and recalling the discussion above about how analysts work not with 
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centralised but with individualised pods of knowledge, an analyst revealed that one of the main 
difficulties Gartner has is of getting its people to speak with one voice: 
…Gartner’s like a herd of cats. It’s like herding cats. The different analyst groups are all very 
independent of each other…We work in teams, where we work very tight in the teams, so we can back 
each other up, and we know what each other is doing. Outside of that team, there is a bit of a 
consolidation but at the kind of company level it has to be driven almost top down to make us look up 
and say ‘what is going on in your area?’ And we all come to meeting where we learn about each others 
research areas. But is more of an kind of interesting background information. It is not going to help me 
do my job (interview, Gartner analyst). 
Interestingly, the passage above points to the difficulties of regulating this kind of knowledge and 
actor. Gartner regularly attempts to establish a more corporate view but analysts are seemingly pulled 
in alternative directions. This perhaps explains (in part) the internal contestation that exists around 
understandings of new technologies. Different ‘teams’ continue to read developments in different 
ways. They have their own ‘lists’ and ‘pods of knowledge’. Those located in different geographical 
locations, for instance, and specialising in the study of one or other related technologies, came to 
differing conclusions. To make sense of this we argue that these analysts applied a different frame to 
the same vendor and this produced contrasting results. It turns out that there were often ‘competing 
frames’ at play within the analyst firm. The example is telling because it shows how the technological 
field Gartner is attempting to shepherd is contested internally. What we want to do now is show how 
the field was also contested externally. This brings us to the final act where we consider how frames 
are ‘adopted’ but also how they can be ‘abandoned’ (Beunza and Garud 2007). 
7 ACT FOUR: FRAME TRANSFORMATION 
7.1 Adopting/Abandoning a Frame 
Gartner are widely seen as the coiners of the CRM concept (Norton 2000). However, whilst it was an 
early player in CRM’s development, it was not the originator of the term. This is identified as the work 
of marketing academics whom were talking and writing about the importance of ‘customer 
relationship marketing’ during the 1980s (Firth and Lawrence 2006). Gartner’s interest is said to have 
begun in the early 1990s when they noticed a growing interest in new kinds of software. One analyst 
described this early involvement: 
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I found in…1993 Gartner created a Sales Leadership Strategy Service…And we created a Sales 
Leadership Strategy Service, and a Customer Services Support Strategy, and an NKT service to focus 
on the marketing director. And that was between 93 and 95. So we were quite early in looking at the 
technologies for sales marketing, customer services completely separately. Then with about you know 
probably only 2 or 3 analysts in each team….That is amazingly early from a Gartner perspective. It was 
about 93, 95 we set up those services. I think only about 96, 97 we decided to put them together into a 
common group (interview, Gartner analyst). 
Once this emerging field was identified (and in keeping with its practice of performing naming 
interventions) Gartner set about re-designating it. Even though already widely identified as Customer 
Relationship Management the analyst firm attempted to re-label the field as Technology Enabled 
Relationship Management’: 
And around about, just after maybe 98 or probably 98, I guess, 98, 99, [Gartner] came up with the term 
‘TERM’. Because [Gartner] said it’s ‘Technology Enabled Relationship Management’. So we were 
pointing out that we’re only going to look at technology not the strategy aspects of it. Our job is to look 
at the technologies that companies use. So they put the three teams together under one bucket called 
‘TERM’ (interview, Gartner analyst). 
Recalling the logic behind this new terminology, the analyst notes how the existing designation was 
founded on an interest in the ‘strategic’ aspects related to customer relationships (the interests of its 
academic founders). Gartner’s proposed name instead was said to reflect an interest in purely the 
‘technologies’ of CRM. This naming intervention did not enjoy the same kinds of success as earlier 
ones (the ERP terminology, around this period, was just reaching the heights of its popularity). Whilst 
Gartner attempted to extend the notion amongst their industry contacts, using all of its organizational 
apparatus and community networks, the name simply failed to ‘ignite’: 
What we were defining as TERM was what most people would understand as CRM today. But nobody 
bought into the term TERM. It just didn’t catch. It didn’t ignite with people ... In effect, the industry 
itself decided it was CRM. That was the term they were going to use. So it was one of these, it comes to 
a point when it is no good pushing against the tide. Even though technically we were more accurate; it 
didn’t matter (interview, Gartner analyst). 
The analyst puts it quite starkly stating how the notion ‘went down like a lead balloon’ with the rest of 
the industry. Had the term been constitutive? Had it affected how vendors labelled their products? The 
analyst was certain that it had not: 
No, not really. There might have been the odd one using it in their literature but they weren’t saying ‘we 
are a TERM vendor’. It didn’t work. It never took off (interview, Gartner analyst). 
The result was that Gartner was forced to abandon the term TERM:  
We [Gartner] probably killed that in about 2000. It lasted probably only about a year, a year and a half, 
between about 99 and 2000 (interview, Gartner analyst). 
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What, if anything, does this failure tell us? It is a demonstration of the contingency surrounding the 
work of a powerful market actor. The industry analyst Gartner plays a crucial role in mobilising 
consensus around emerging technological fields. But this example shows however that it is not able to 
impose its view. Even the seemingly most influential of industry analysts can still fail to mobilise 
others around its vision of the world. We labour this point because we think it significant in terms of 
the shaping of a major organizational technology. We speculate that Gartner’s failure to impose its 
frame had important consequences for this solution: CRM has not seen the same kinds of stability that 
one finds in earlier fields (like ERP). The biography of CRM appears to be different and perhaps more 
diffuse because of this.  
7.2 Result of Abandoning: Increase in Ambiguity? 
Shortly after the turn of the century, CRM technology had begun to resemble the ‘organizing visions’ 
described by Swanson and Ramiller (1997). The notion was being pulled in many different directions 
by various players. A Gartner analyst notes some of the transformations that CRM has experienced:  
CRM has been called customer interaction management, technology-enabled relationship management, 
enterprise relationship management, demand chain management and customer value management 
(Maoz 2001).  
During this period, one of the only things that commentators appeared to be able to agree on was the 
level of confusion that had now developed around the technology. A Gartner analyst interviewed in 
the practitioner press makes the following point: 
Well, I think the people that are confused are analysts, journalists, vendors and, perhaps, consultants. I 
don't think the organizations that are involved are that confused about what they're trying to do. I've 
called it the ‘flag-of-convenience’ problem, in that they have a name for the program, the project, the 
initiative, the ‘whatever they call it’, internally. And, the term ‘CRM’ lost its shine in about 2001, so 
they renamed it in many cases, or they shut it down or repackaged it or refocused it, whatever 
(Thompson 2004). 
Here the analyst points to how CRM has become nothing but a ‘flag of convenience’ – a term that 
could be ‘shut down’, ‘repackaged’ or ‘refocused’ depending on a player’s interests and 
circumstances. Interestingly, despite their loosening grip on the field, this does not prevent Gartner 
from making periodic attempts to make further interventions. During the period, pushed by the 
apparent disaccord, but also the fact CRM was caught up in the fallout surrounding the bursting of the 
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dot.com bubble, Gartner continued to set up meetings with the idea of getting the major players to 
agree a new name:  
It is interesting, around 2001, we talked to companies. We were talking about CRM strategies to people 
and they were saying: ‘We would rather call it customer strategy supported by CRM technology’. So 
around 2001, when it got discredited with the ‘bust’, in 2001, 2003, there were a lot of companies 
saying that they don’t want to call it CRM anymore. In fact, we had meetings with all the major 
integrators, consultancies to say: ‘Shall we come up with a new term?’. The problem was nobody could 
agree a term. Everybody tries to fragment in different directions. So it never, CRM ended up having this 
double meaning: it means something to do with business strategy…which is the original meaning; and it 
means to do with the technology. So it has this, it is confusing to people… (interview, Gartner analyst). 
What this suggests is that the framing capacities of industry analysts change over time. Despite its 
organizational machinery and extensive community connections, Gartner were seemingly unable to 
get the players to agree a common term. Thus they move from a rather rigid position to a more 
encompassing and open one. As a result, a certain amount of disorganization becomes evident in the 
sector. Indeed one analyst interviewed in the practitioner press describes how he advocates, when 
talking to clients, that they should now develop their own understanding of the term:   
About 1998 Gartner sat down and wrote a big definition, which starts with the word, ‘CRM’, and 
defines it specifically as a business strategy, and we've stuck with that definition now for about—well, 
ever since '98. But, since 2002, our message has been pretty straightforward, which is: Ignore our 
definition of CRM, and in fact, ignore everybody else's definition of CRM and come up with your own 
definition.…In fact, something we're doing right this moment is questioning not the definition of CRM 
but whether the term "CRM," itself, should still be used. And, we're wondering whether it's finally 
coming to an end as a useful acronym. Gartner had TERM up till about '99. And, since then, we've 
stuck with the industry phrase of CRM (Thompson 2004).  
We have argued that the knowledge frame industry analysts apply to an area of activity allows them to 
inform and regulate the various goings on in that area. However, the frame that appeared applicable 
back in ‘1998’ now no longer seemed to apply. Where at the beginning of the century Gartner was 
attempting to regulate the offerings of vendors, it had, just a few years later, as one analyst pointed 
out, become ‘less dogmatic than [it was] were back in 98’. Gartner appears no longer to be the sole 
actor attempting to shepherd this particular field. 
To summarise this section, what we have shown is that the industry analyst firm studied was not able 
to impose its view on the CRM field in the same way it had done in earlier years. CRM was now being 
understood and interpreted in many different ways (in this respect the work of Swanson and Ramiller 
[1997] shows itself still to be highly relevant). However, whereas these scholars suggest that (a certain 
amount of) ambiguity can aide the proliferation of a new name, we would argue that it is precisely this 
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ambiguity that industry analysts are attempting to police. If a technological field cannot be defined 
then it becomes difficult to regulate vendors within it. Thus, the increase in ambiguity meant that 
Gartner was forced to modify its position – or, in other words, to ‘break frame’ (Goffman 1974). 
8 DISCUSSION 
We join scholars interested in making sense of the abundance of new terminologies that continue to 
proliferate within the information technology domain (Swanson and Ramiller 1997, Wang 2009). Our 
particular entrance point has been to note the way certain standard and stable designations emerge and 
come to be applied to broadly similar, or, in some cases, differing set of artefacts. A more or less 
similar collection of rapidly evolving artefacts can be given common nomenclatures that then go on to 
endure for prolonged periods of time. We have sought to answer the question as to who decides 
whether or not a particular vendor technology is part of a wider terminology. Who, in other words, 
decides the boundaries around different nomenclatures? We have pointed to the effort of the 
‘knowledge institutions of information technology’ (Abrahamson and Fairchild 2001, Wang and 
Swanson 2007, 2008, Swanson 2010) that shepherd the consensus around new and emerging 
technological fields. This is in particular the role of industry analysts – and specifically of Gartner Inc. 
– who appear to play a role in deciding not only a name but also the interpretation of that designation. 
Below we outline the various ways in which they do this (i-vii). 
The firm of industry analysts studied is most well known for its (i) naming interventions. The 
designation of a technological field of activity is not trivial. If successful, such interventions can go on 
to provide crucial resources and constraints within which vendors and management and technology 
consultants’ articulate offerings. We have drawn on the ‘communitarian’ perspective to how new 
concepts achieve wide currency in a process catalysed through the activities of certain key players – in 
the case of Customer Relationship Management (CRM), notably vendors, consultants and industry 
analysts – but also ultimately sustained by the activities of wider communities of organizational users 
and others (Swanson and Ramiller 1997, Wang and Ramiller 2009, Wang 2009, Swanson 2010). 
Naming interventions can reduce uncertainty for adopters and developers alike. The establishment of a 
new field draws boundaries around a set of artefacts and their suppliers and thereby create a space in 
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which some sorting and ranking may be possible. This often paves the way for a comparative analysis 
by adopters of the relative advantages of particular offerings for their specific organization. Clustering 
new kinds of offerings together may also serve to reinforce expectations about what functionality 
should be included and where the technology will go in the future. This also allows vendors to assess 
their products, their promotion and enhancement in relation to the features of broadly comparable 
products and their likely future development trajectories (in some case differentiating their offering).  
However, just as a name can include it can easily become a ‘barrier’ - something that ‘prevents’ and 
‘constrains’. This can generate controversy, especially amongst those that become marginalised by it. 
Industry analysts can be seen to police the boundaries that they and others have previously set out 
through performing various kinds of (ii) categorization work, where they are able to say whether or 
not a particular vendor solution is part of a technological field. They can do this because, as the work 
on ‘critics’ informs us, they view the world through ‘product classifications’ (Zuckerman 1999). in 
this view vendors that fall outside this lens “are penalized not simply because they raise information 
costs for consumers but because the social boundaries that divide product classes limit the 
consideration of such offerings” (ibid., 1404). This perspective usefully flags how the IT innovation 
community (Wang and Ramiller 2009) is not an entirely open and equal community as there are forms 
of knowledge that actors are forced to take into account but which they are not necessarily able to 
shape (cf. Adler and Heckscher 2006).  
We have also made use of the ‘finitist’ argument that categorization is not straightforward but involves 
‘a decision’. Reaching a decision can lead to various forms of ‘contestation’ and, as Barnes et al. 
(1996) suggest, experts can often categorize the same object in contrasting ways. We saw how the 
seemingly novel technology produced by one newcomer was problematised and then with how, in 
turn, it disputed the negative reviews it received (going as far as to call into question the industry 
analyst firm’s research process). The newcomer appeared to fall between different ‘frames’ within the 
same industry analyst firm, each of which brought different problematics and qualities to the surface. 
This was damaging for the vendor’s immediate and longer-term future: it not only lost out in the 
procurement contest described here but it also, as far as we know, has not been able to enter this 
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specific geographical and sectoral specific market; nor does it continue to position itself in the same 
way in relation to other CRM vendors. (Even though it was at odds with how the industry analyst firm 
(and others) conceived of CRM it has since come into line with the prevailing definition).  
One other issue we raise with regard to the critics perspective is the suggestion that it is ‘social’ 
boundaries that limit the consideration of particular vendors. Zuckerman (1999) suggests that actors 
employ categories to interpret the offers set before them. Yet we are frankly sceptical that, by 
themselves, product terminologies can perform this role (particularly, as we learn from the finitist 
analysis, there can be much complexity and confusion surrounding classifications). Something else 
must be enabling these screening processes. One reason why the work of industry analyst is 
‘authoritative’ is that their frames are shot through with various forms of (iii) intellectual and material 
equipment. The particular equipment we observed during fieldwork was ‘lists’. We might go as far as 
to suggest that one of the prime roles of industry analysts is filling out emerging technological fields 
with lists of varying description. List making appears to be rife within industry analysts firms. In all of 
the Gartner presentations and workshops that we attended the audience was treated to various kinds of 
lists: lists ‘of cool vendors’, ‘of the priorities of Chief Information Officers’, ‘of the various kinds of 
functionality found in systems’, ‘of ranked vendors’, etc. (see Bowker and Star [1994] for the 
importance of list making). Moreover, lists turn out to be particularly effective in sorting vendors. 
Whether or not someone appears on a list is (generally) not thought to be a matter for interpretation. A 
vendor’s absence from a list can have an effect even if people disagree about the accuracy of 
associated categorization process (Author Study 2007).  
A further reason the work of industry analysts has influence is that, when necessary, they will 
vigorously (iv) defend their frame. It is here our paper adds (in some small way) to Beunza and Garud 
(2007). Industry analysts are not only frame builders but they have established ways to evidence and 
shore up their boundary work (meaning they are ‘frame defenders’). Indeed when making claims and 
interacting with clients we found there to be different modalities at play: they were times when 
industry analysts sought to signal quite clearly to adopters their (often critical) assessment of specific 
vendors, as well as contexts in which they were less candid as they sought to protect and shield 
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themselves. This was because, attached to recommendations, was the issue of liability and 
responsibility. Industry analysts need to make their views accountable – in terms of presenting them as 
the result of systematic process and in being able to defend their judgements. The principal ways in 
which industry analysts appeared to do this was through commensuration as well as by pointing to the 
provenance of assessments. Commensuration appears to provide industry analysts with a means to 
smooth away possible contestation (Espeland and Stevens 1998). The literature on product 
classifications suggests that placing a vendor in the context of others is an attempt to weaken its claim 
that its offerings are novel (Kennedy 2008). It is through comparing the offerings of different vendors 
that it seemingly becomes ‘obvious’ to everyone how things really stand. As for the provenance of 
their views, industry analysts claim that assessments are developed out of their many interactions with 
their client base. They rely on the testimony of these wider communities of users and decision makers. 
It is not them casting aspersions, they are simply reporting back (and aggregating) what their clients 
are reportedly telling them. In this respect, we might consider that the frames of industry analysts 
depend on these kinds of interactions. In other words, that they are (v) entangled with wider 
communities of users.  
Another way of capturing all these various points (i-v) is to say that new terminologies are often 
coupled to the practices, artefacts and communities of those who produce them (Hyysalo 2006). This 
attempts to capture the role these market experts play in shepherding terms but also how they are 
simultaneously attempting to realise and regulate the various boundaries proposed by the designations 
they and others deploy.  
We have also been careful to draw attention to the limits on how industry analysts proceed. These 
actors have become highly influential in drawing the boundaries around technologies but they are not 
able to impose their view. This was best exemplified, internally, when we saw how two teams of 
analysts failed to agree on the nature of the vendor technology they were both examining and then, 
externally, when the analyst firm was not able to convince others of the merits of a particular 
terminology (‘Technology Enabled Relationship Management’). This evidences how industry analysts 
have limits in relation to their capacity to organise and speak about the events they come across. These 
 36 
experts are attempting to organise the consensus surrounding a technological field. It should perhaps 
be no surprise that they come across areas where the boundaries have already been drawn (or have 
been drawn differently to the ones they are proposing). When this happens, the industry analysts may 
break frame (Goffman 1974). In other words, these (vi) experts do not always stick to their frame. 
This contradicts Beunza and Garud’s (2007) suggestion that, once committed, analysts necessarily 
persevere with a position because to do otherwise would seemingly bring into question their 
credibility. However, our fieldwork suggests that this may not be the only element here. Industry 
analyst firms recognise (and will at times openly acknowledge) ‘misframings’. In other words, they 
are not afraid to withdraw a term that is competing against an incumbent terminology, especially if it 
appears only to be adding further confusion.  
We also suggest that (vii) the framing capacities of industry analysts may change over time. When 
Gartner coined the notion of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) back in 1990, for instance, the firm 
had already been in existence for more than a decade. Whilst it had a number of rivals (Computer 
Intelligence, Dataquest, IDC, Input and Yankee were all well established by then) it had managed to 
develop the cognitive authority to make this important naming intervention. Few other organizations at 
the time could mobilise the organizational machinery and community connections necessary to draw 
and maintain the boundaries around a new technological field of activity. Ten years later, however, 
during the period when CRM was taking off, Gartner found itself competing with many other industry 
experts. Today, there is a large active body of industry experts and consultants writing, blogging, and 
selling ideas about technology. It appears that not only has a market for this form of boundary work 
been created but that competition between various intermediaries has helped foster the ambiguity that 
we now find surrounding discussions of CRM. Since no one player dominates this means that all 
attempts to define the particular technological field may have an effect.  
8.1 Further Research 
We conclude by calling for increased attention to the knowledge institutions of information 
technology (Abrahamson and Fairchild 2001, Wang and Swanson 2007, 2008, Swanson 2010). 
Through their appearance, we have seen a shift from a relatively simple market of ideas to a more 
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organised and structured one. Industry analysts play a crucial role in shaping technological fields. 
Their work may have immediate consequences for technology vendors and more broadly for the 
direction and pace of innovation within the wider IT arena. One implication of their work, not 
particularly emphasised in the present paper, is that it may stifle novelty. Vendors who offer 
something different may find their products do not conform to standard product definitions and thus 
may fall between classification schemes (and be problematized). This conjecture alone deserves 
further attention. Furthermore, we speculate that in a context of accelerating technological innovation, 
that gives new challenges and uncertainties to potential innovators or adopters, and where the normal 
processes of decision-making are deemed to be inadequate, there will be a growing number of experts 
of various types attempting to shape emerging technological fields. Clearly not all these actors will 
influence innovation in the same way or to the same extent; only a small number will produce terms 
able to designate actual fields; only some will be in a position to categorize vendor technologies. 
However, there is a need for IS scholars to develop the analytical tools and frameworks to allow 
researchers to carry out a systematic and sophisticated study of their influence. Our research also 
suggests we may need to address a possible spectrum of knowledge institutions with, at one end of the 
scale, powerful bodies such as the industry analyst firm described here, which explicitly sees itself as 
organising and shepherding technological fields, whilst at the other end actors and organizations that 
may be less central and may not necessarily even recognise their role as such. We have produced a 
study covering one part of the spectrum, where one group has managed to command the centre of 
attention, but there are many other kinds of organization and actor deserving of study. The recent 
upsurge of ‘technology bloggers’, for instance, is particularly pertinent in this latter respect (Davidson 
and Vaast 2009).  
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